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 The Help America Vote Act (HAVA), passed in 2002, requires that states 
implement “… a single, uniform, official, centralized, interactive computerized statewide 
voter registration list defined, maintained, and administered at the State level that 
contains the name and registration information of every legally registered voter in the 
State and assigns a unique identifier to each legally registered voter in the State.”  Many 
states are now rushing to meet these requirements by January 1, 2006, and by the time of 
the November 2006 federal elections it is likely that virtually all states will have their 
statewide voter registration system operational. 
 
These new statewide voter registration systems pose new risks for election 
administration, for a number of reasons.  In most states voter registration processes and 
data prior to HAVA were primarily a local activity, controlled by a local jurisdiction, 
typically a county election official.   Such decentralization meant that effectively in most 
states there multiple voter registration processes and systems, and that mounting a 
systematic attack on the voter registration process in most states implied attacking a 
variety of different voter registration systems, operating in many different locations, 
using different types of hardware and software, and so on.  The post-HAVA reality in 
most states will be a single centralized system, and thus, a single place where attackers 
can focus their energies. 
 
 One critical problem regarding threats to statewide voter registration systems is 
that there are no existing standards for these databases, nor is there a corresponding 
testing and certification process to insure that the databases comply with these standards.  
Here I offer some analysis of potential threats to statewide voter registration systems, 
which might help fuel further analysis and discussion of the development of standards, 
testing and certification for HAVA-compliant statewide voter registration systems.  I 
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conclude that one important way to mitigate some of these risks is through the 
development of standards, and that we clearly need close study of statewide voter 
registration systems as they are implemented in 2006. 
  
 The threats to statewide voter registration systems fall into four categories: 
authenticity of the registration file, secrecy of the registration file, integrity of the 
registration file, and potential voter registration system failures. 2   I discuss each in turn 
briefly below. 
 
Authenticity of the registration file 
 
 A first threat to authenticity of the statewide voter registration file arises due to 
the centralization of the voter registration list.  The new centralized statewide voter 
registration systems required by HAVA will involve some form of data transfer between 
the local election officials, who in many states will retain some responsibility for the 
voter registration data and who will need the voter registration data for a wide range 
election administration tasks.  This means that these statewide systems will involve voter 
registration data being passed from state to localities, which implies new points of 
vulnerability --- during the data transmission process and in the local election office.  So 
while there is a centralized statewide list, it is possible that attackers could isolate points 
of vulnerability in the transmission path, or in one of many local election offices and 
possibly access the state list via local vulnerabilities that might be outside the direct 
control of state election officials. 
 
 Second, the statewide voter lists will be interactive with other databases, as 
required by HAVA, in particular state Department of Motor Vehicle and Social Security 
Administration databases.  Again, the statewide voter data will be transmitted for 
comparison to those lists, and thus again be potentially vulnerable in transmission and 
when in places potentially outside the state election official’s control.  There has also 
been much talk recently about potential interoperability of statewide voter registration 
lists between states, which depending upon how implemented again may open the door 
for new vulnerabilities not experienced in the former decentralized voter registration 
systems in place throughout most of the nation before the passage of HAVA.3  Thus, 
these potential vulnerabilities imply that attackers could have access to voter registration 
information and the ability to alter that information or add entries to the file. 
Secrecy of the registration file 
 
 There are potential privacy concerns with the new statewide voter registration 
lists.  There will be a great deal of information in statewide voter lists, including voter 
addresses, birthdays, and contact information; voter history data; and other identifying 
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information including either partial or complete social security numbers, drivers license 
numbers, or other state identification numbers.  This data could be of great use for 
commercial purposes, or for other more nefarious purposes (identify theft, stalking, or 
other illegal purposes).  On the other hand, we clearly desire that voter registration 
information, at least at some level, be available for use by academics, political 
organizations, and other observers of elections to allow for external scrutiny of these data 
to insure the databases have high integrity.   Thus a balance must be struck, between the 
need to insure the privacy of the centralized statewide voter registration list (especially 
elements in that file that might be attractive for identity theft), and the need to allow 
public access to voter registration data for external analysis and review. 
 
Integrity of the registration file 
 
 Prior to the development of statewide voter registration lists, responsibility for the 
voter registration files typically resided at the local level.  With the state-centralized voter 
registration files under HAVA, it is unclear how responsibility for the integrity of the 
information in the files will be distributed between state and local election officials.   If 
much of the responsibility for the information rests at the state level, which might make 
the job of verifying local registration status more difficult than if local officials controlled 
the information.  If the responsibility is somehow shared between the state and local 
levels, the possibility arises that the voter registration data could be corrupted if file 
updating is not done correctly.  These threats to the integrity of the new statewide voter 
registration lists need further examination, especially as new state systems are 
implemented. 
Potential voter registration system failures 
 
These threats run from unintentional system malfunctions to malicious attacks.  
For example, we have all experienced computer failures of various sorts in our 
experience; centralized statewide voter registration files should be implemented using 
systems that seek to minimize these failures and which will prevent data loss or 
corruption when system failures occur (this is an example where standards would be very 
helpful).  At the other end of the spectrum would be a general “denial of service” attack 
on a statewide voter registration system, where the attacker would attempt to make it 
difficult or impossible for local election officials to access the statewide voter registration 
list immediately before, during, or after the election.   There is thus need to study these 
risks and vulnerabilities and to insure that voter registration systems are robust and 
hardened. 
Need for understanding the threats to statewide voter registration 
files 
 
 Unfortunately, unlike the technologies that are used for ballot casting and 
tabulation, the technologies that are being put in place to satisfy the HAVA requirements 
have not been developed necessarily consistently with any national or state standards, nor 
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with any necessary state or federal testing and certification process in place.   While the 
current state and federal testing and certification process for ballot casting and tabulation 
technology is not perfect (in fact the federal Voluntary Voting System Guidelines are 
now under revision), the state and federal processes now in place do provide some level 
of assurance that certain standards have been met.  We simply do not necessarily have 
that level of assurance for the new statewide voter registration systems that will be in 
place throughout the nation after January 1, 2006. 
 
 While this analysis of potential threats is by definition somewhat vague, because 
either the statewide files are not operational yet or they have not been operational long 
enough to determine in more precise detail their vulnerabilities, there is reason for 
analysis and study of attacks on statewide voter registration systems.  The incentives to 
attack a statewide voter registration list are great: 
 
- An attacker could, with access to the statewide list, engage in various types of 
election fraud.  The attacker could register fictitious voters, and could attempt to 
cast ballots using the fictitious via by-mail absentee voting.   This could be very 
difficult to detect, if done as part of a careful and sustained attack on the voter 
registration system. 
 
- The attack could instead focus on disenfranchising registered voters, effectively 
mounting a “denial-of-service” attack on precinct voting.  With access to the 
statewide voter list, the attacker could potentially remove voters from the list, 
move them to inactive status, alter their address information --- or do any number 
of things with the file to make it difficult or impossible for the voter to be allowed 
to cast a ballot when he or she tried to vote. 
 
- The attack could be a “denial-of-service” attack on the voter registration system 
itself; if local election officials try to access voter registration data in the days 
immediately before or after an election, the attacker could mount a “denial-of-
service” attack on the local officials computer system --- or the system where the 
statewide list is controlled.  This could lead to significant disruption of early or 
absentee voting, election day activities, or pre- and post-election administration 
tasks.  This risk could be mitigated somewhat by providing the voter registration 
data to the local officials before election day. 
 
- A similar attack could focus on “electronic pollbooks”, especially those that are 
used in precincts on election day.  An attacker could mount a “denial-of-service” 
attack on a server that distributes voter registration data before the election to 
“electronic pollbooks”, and thereby possibly cause a serious disruption in the 
election if voter registration data is not easily available in polling places. 
 
- As noted earlier, the attack could focus on obtaining voter registration data for 
other purposes, either commercial data mining or identity theft (for two possible 
examples), especially if the attacker could access the database at levels where 
important data like drivers license or social security numbers are stored.  But 
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voter registration data, even without that sort of identifying information 
associated with it, could still be vulnerable to theft and inappropriate use, as there 
still are many purposes that voter registration data with names, addresses, birth 
dates, and other contact information could be used for. 
 
These are just some of the potential threats to statewide voter registration lists.  No doubt, 
as these files become operative and are used, other potential or real threats to these 
systems will arise.  We clearly need more analysis of the security vulnerabilities of these 
systems as they are implemented in 2006 and beyond.  We also need development of 
standards for these systems, and processes for testing and certification to those standards. 
